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Summary 
The UK’s decommissioning plans are advanced and probably better documented than 
elsewhere in Europe, mainly because UK was a pioneer in nuclear power and already has 
many retired nuclear facilities that need to be decommissioned. The UK government’s 
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) was set up in 2005 to take over the sites 
previously owned by BNFL and the UKAEA and is expected to manage the 
decommissioning of British Energy’s sites. 
The total cost of decommissioning Britain’s civil nuclear facilities is currently estimated to 
be in excess of £75bn, although it is widely expected that this figure will rise. The cost 
estimates are dominated by two sites, Dounreay and Sellafield, which account for about 
75 per cent of the total liability. These sites have two things in common: large amounts of 
plutonium were handled there and they were both sites of accidents that led to the release 
of radioactive material. 
British governments have continued to avow the ‘polluter pays’ principle as a basis of their 
environmental policy, which implies that funds to decommission facilities should be 
provided by consumers of the output of these plants. Despite this, funding has been 
mismanaged and as a result, after more than 25 years of contributions, there is only about 
£800m in identified funds to pay for a liability of more than £75bn. 
A segregated fund (NDF) for British Energy’s power plants was set up when British 
Energy was created in 1996. However, the scope of the fund was inadequate - it did not 
cover stage 1 – and British Energy collapsed in 2002. This illustrates that even a 
segregated fund, which relies on contributions from consumers over the expected life of 
the plant, is not a guarantee that adequate funds will be available when needed. 
British Energy was rescued at huge expense to British taxpayers. The NDF has been 
renamed the NLF and expanded to cover payments for some fuel waste management 
costs. British Energy will make contributions to the fund, but these are related to their 
ability to pay, not to the scale of the liability. The contributions are also heavily dependent 
on the profitability of British Energy. Should the company again find itself in financial 
difficulties, an eventuality that is by no means unlikely, the fund could again be at risk of 
falling far short of the required amount. Expanding the fund to include some spent fuel 
disposal costs might seem a good way to ensure these costs are covered. However, in 
practical terms, the effect of this change might be simply to allow the Treasury to access it 
earlier than it would have otherwise been able to postponing the time when taxpayer 
funds were needed. As the NDF only covered stages 2 and 3, most of the funds would not 
have been accessible for 70 years or more. 
By international standards, UK timescales for decommissioning are long: completion of 
final clearance for nuclear power plants is not expected until up to 130 years after plant 
closure. NDA has an objective to reduce this to 25 years, which will tend to increase 
undiscounted costs and massively increase discounted costs. While the NDA has a 
supervisory role over plans to decommission British Energy’s plants, it is not clear whether 
it is able to require British Energy to reduce the timescales for its plants, which on current 
plans assume site clearance is not complete until nearly 100 years after plant closure. 
The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority might be a useful (not perfect) model for other 
countries for managing decommissioning once the facilities have closed. It creates an 
agency that was not party to the creation of the liabilities and is not a commercial concern. 
It therefore has no prior interest in minimising cost estimates or lengthening time-scales in 
order to reduce the present value of its liabilities or to bolster its technical reputation. The 
NDA has contributed to transparency by published a vast amount of useful and accessible 
material on its decommissioning plans and the estimated costs through the ‘Lifecycle 
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Baselines’ it publishes for each of its main facilities. The NDA may, in due course, suffer 
‘capture’ by the nuclear industry or it might feel the need to cut costs to demonstrate its 
management skills but, to date, NDA has improved the transparency of the 
decommissioning Process significantly. 
Ironically, the failure of British Energy and the transfer of most of its decommissioning 
liabilities to the taxpayer also removed the incentives on British Energy to reduce the 
decommissioning liabilities for short-term commercial reasons, albeit at the expense of 
having to abandon the ‘polluter pays’ principle. 
It is difficult to determine to what extent the recent steep increases in decommissioning 
cost estimates are the result of the removal of the commercial pressures to reduce 
forecast liabilities and how far the increases are the result of more detailed planning of 
decommissioning. 
While facilities are still in operation, the operator will have much more intimate knowledge 
of the facility and must play the lead role in planning and estimating the cost of 
decommissioning. However, British experience does seem to underline the importance 
subjecting plans and cost estimates to regular independent scrutiny to prevent commercial 
interests distorting plans. 
The British government is now contemplating building up to ten nuclear plants. In October 
2006, the British government was still developing its plans on how decommissioning 
would be provisioned for any new plants. It will be important to ensure that any measures 
adopted are likely to be more effective than the previous efforts in Britain to make the 
‘polluter pay’ and ensure that those that have to decommission the nuclear plants that 
current consumers will benefit from are endowed with adequate funds to carry out the task 
even if, unavoidably, they will have to do the potentially hazardous job. Somewhat 
surprisingly, in the list of principles that would under lie a decommissioning, the polluter 
pays principle is not listed.1  
                                       
1 The principles the government listed are: There should be an upfront assessment of decommissioning costs; 
Full responsibility for decommissioning costs to be retained by the private sector operator(s); Protection will 
be given to the public sector regarding credit risk and reduced reactor life; The framework should be robust 
and transparent through time; These principles will form the basis of arrangements which will apply 
consistently to all new build operators and reactor types. http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file31890.pdf  
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1. Introduction and overview 
The UK was a pioneer of nuclear power operating power plants from 1955 onwards. As a 
result of this long history, the UK will also be a pioneer in decommissioning these plants. 
Already, there are seven commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs) that have been closed 
and are at various stages of decommissioning and several other experimental, prototype 
and fuel cycle facilities that are being decommissioned. However, the technologies used – 
gas-cooled graphite-moderated reactors for all but one of UK’s 19 NPPs – mean that the 
techniques will not be directly transferable to the rest of Europe and the costs might not be 
typical. 
The most costly sites to decommission will be the Sellafield and Dounreay sites. The 
technologies used at these sites – reprocessing at Sellafield and fast reactors at 
Dounreay – are not widely used in the rest of Europe, so experience here will also be of 
limited relevance to the rest of Europe. In addition, accidents at the Windscale part of the 
Sellafield site in 1957 and Dounreay in 1977 will make the decommissioning task 
particularly challenging and expensive and mean that on current plans, there is no 
expectation that these sites can ever be restored to ‘greenfield’ status (i.e., released for 
unrestricted use). 
Some of the early facilities, such as the first power plants and the first reprocessing plant 
were dual purpose civil and military facilities and a small part of the funding for 
decommissioning for these facilities is expected to come partly specifically from the 
Ministry of Defence. The vast majority of funding will be paid for by future taxpayers 
through the Treasury at the time the expenditure is incurred via a newly created 
government agency, the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). 
1.1 Government policy 
In 2001-02, the British government undertook a major review of energy policy resulting in 
a White Paper2. The Department for Environment and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) states3: 
The White Paper makes clear that developing energy efficiency and renewable energy is the 
Government's priority. The Government is therefore not making specific proposals to support 
new nuclear build now. It notes that "while nuclear is currently an important source of carbon 
free electricity, the current economics of nuclear power make it an unattractive option for new 
generating capacity and there are also important issues for nuclear waste to be resolved". But 
the possibility that new nuclear build might be needed in the future to meet carbon reduction 
objectives is not being ruled out.  
In 2005, the British government announced a new review of energy policy, widely reported 
as paving the way for a new government policy leading to new orders for nuclear plants. 
For example, in a speech in May 2006, Tony Blair was quoted as saying nuclear power is 
‘back on the agenda with a vengeance’4. A consultation paper was published in January 
20065 and, in July 2006, the government’s report on the Energy Review was published. It 
was announced that a White Paper would be published at the ‘end of the year’6 [2006/07]. 
                                       
2 Department of Trade & Industry (2003) ‘Energy White Paper: Our energy future – creating a low carbon 
economy’ TSO, Norwich 
3 http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/radioactivity/government/uk/energypolicy.htm  
4 The Independent ‘PM says nuclear power is “back on the agenda”’, May 17, 2006, p 4. 
5 Department of Trade & Industry (2005) ‘Our Energy Challenge: Securing clean affordable energy for the 
long-term’  
6 http://www.dti.gov.uk/about/dti-ministerial-team/page31953.html 
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The British Government’s policy on decommissioning of nuclear facilities is based on the 
government’s White Papers of 1995 and 2004 on radioactive waste management7 and 
policy on timing, the role of regulatory bodies and financial provisioning was summarised 
clearly in the Nuclear Installation Inspectorate’s 2001 review of British Energy’s 
decommissioning plans8: 
1. The White Paper on radioactive waste management policy (Cm 2919, reference 1,paragraph 
124) states: "The Government believes that, in general, the process of decommissioning 
nuclear plants should be undertaken as soon as it is reasonably practicable to do so, taking 
account of all relevant factors. In future it will ask all nuclear operators to draw up strategies for 
decommissioning their redundant plant. These will need to include justification of the timetables 
proposed and demonstration of the adequacy of financial provision being made to implement 
the strategies." 
2. The White Paper concludes that there are a number of potentially feasible and acceptable 
decommissioning strategies for nuclear power stations and other nuclear facilities available to 
the operator. To ensure that the operators’ decommissioning strategies remain soundly based 
as circumstances change, the White Paper places a requirement (reference 1, paragraphs 
126,127 and 183) that the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) reviews these strategies 
quinquennially, in consultation with the environment agencies. The HSE asked HM Nuclear 
Installations Inspectorate (NII) to undertake the reviews on its behalf. The NII is one of the 
specialist inspectorates of the HSE. 
3. The White Paper records the importance of ensuring that appropriate financial arrangements 
are in place to cover the costs of decommissioning nuclear facilities. It concluded that 
segregated funds should be established for those parts of the industry that are privatised. A 
segregated fund has been established for British Energy plc (BE). The fund is designed to 
provide finance for BE's long term decommissioning liabilities. However, the fund excludes 
those liabilities relating to defuelling and post operational clean out of BE's nuclear facilities, as 
well as BE's liabilities for HLW and ILW stored on other licensees' nuclear sites. These excluded 
activities are financed from BE's operational funds and provisions. 
As described in section 3.1.6, the situation described in paragraph 3 no longer exists. The 
scope of the fund has been widened to cover dealing with spent fuel from the Sizewell B 
PWR and it is no longer expected to cover the full cost of stages 2 and 3 of the 
decommissioning process. The government will now provide the balance of funds needed. 
The Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM) is an independent 
committee appointed by the UK Government. Its task was to review the options for 
managing those UK radioactive wastes for which there is no agreed long-term solution.  
CoRWM was asked to consult and to make recommendations to the UK Government in 
July 2006. In July 2006, CoRWM published its final report9. 
1.2 Facilities 
The UK’s nuclear facilities can be split into three categories (see Table 1 and Table 2): the 
more modern nuclear power plants - owned by the privatised generation company, British 
Energy; all other civil nuclear facilities - owned by the government agency, the Nuclear 
Decommissioning Authority; and the military nuclear facilities - not covered in this report. 
                                       
7 Department of Environment (1995) ‘Review of radioactive waste management policy’ Cm 2919, HMSO, 
London and UK Government (2002) ‘A better quality of life: a strategy for sustainable development for the 
UK’ (Cm 4345, The Stationery Office, London, ISBN 0-10-143452-9. 
8 Nuclear Installations Inspectorate ‘A review by HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate of the British Energy 
plc’s strategy for decommissioning its nuclear licensed sites.’ p 1. Health & Safety Executive, Bootle. 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/beqqr.pdf  
9 CoRWM (2006) ‘Managing our radioactive waste safely: CoRWM’s recommendations to government’ 
CoRWM, London. http://www.corwm.org.uk/pdf/FullReport.pdf  
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1.2.1 British Energy 
British Energy was created in 1996 when the more modern nuclear power plants were 
privatised. These included seven Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR) stations and one 
Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR). The AGR stations comprise twin reactors with an 
output of about 600MW (e) per reactor. These were completed between 1976 and 1989 
and are expected, on current plans, to have an operating life of 35 years or more and will 
thus be closed between 2011 and 2024. These plants were built by the nationally-owned 
utilities, Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB, five stations) and the South of 
Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB, two stations). In 1990, when the UK electricity industry 
was reorganised and privatised, the nuclear plants were found to be unsaleable and had 
to be transferred to new publicly owned companies, Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear 
respectively. The PWR (Sizewell B) was ordered by the CEGB but largely built by Nuclear 
Electric. It was completed in 1995 and is expected to have a 40 year life and thus be 
retired in 2035. 
This report focuses on the Hinkley Point B nuclear power plant, which is expected to be 
the first facility to be closed (in the same year as its sister station, Hunterston B), in 2011. 
However, few details have been published on the specific plan for Hinkley Point B. 
1.2.2 Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) 
In 2005, ownership of all civil nuclear facilities other than those owned by British Energy 
were transferred to NDA from British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL, a publicly owned 
nuclear company then active in almost all aspects of nuclear power) and UKAEA (another 
publicly owned company that carried out R&D into nuclear power and built a number of 
prototype and demonstration facilities). The NDA was established under the Energy Act 
200410. The setting up of the NDA, which absolved BNFL for responsibility for meeting its 
liabilities, was investigated under the European Union’s state aid regulations and in April 
2006, the European Commission published its finding that the setting up of NDA did not 
contravene State Aid regulations11. 
The NDA is a management organisation and it contracts out the operation of the facilities 
that remain in service to companies such as BNFL (the BNG division) and UKAEA. 
Decommissioning will be managed by NDA and the work will be allocated largely by 
competitive tender. 
The main site owned by NDA, in terms of decommissioning liability, is Sellafield where a 
wide range of facilities exist and which accounts for about 70 per cent of the NDA’s 
decommissioning liability. Other important sites include the 11 ‘Magnox’ civil nuclear 
power stations and the Dounreay site where fast breeder technology was developed and 
demonstrated. 
The 11 Magnox stations were the first generation British nuclear power plant design. The 
first two plants were dual purpose generation and plutonium production facilities and 
comprised four reactors each of about 50MW (e). They were built by the UKAEA and 
subsequently transferred to BNFL when it was created. These were completed from 1956-
60 and both stations were closed in 2003/04. One of these, the Calder Hall plant is sited 
alongside the Sellafield site, but its decommissioning plans and budget are separate from 
that of the rest of the Sellafield site. 
                                       
10 HM Government (2004) ‘Energy Act’, TSO, London. http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2004/20040020.htm  
11 European Commission (2006) ‘Commission Decision of 4 April 2006 on the State Aid which the United 
Kingdom is planning to implement for the establishment of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority’ 
Official Journal of the European Union, L 268/37, 27.9.2006. 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_268/l_26820060927en00370057.pdf  
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The other nine stations were civil plants built by the former nationally owned generation 
companies, CEGB (eight stations) and SSEB (one station). In 1990, these were 
transferred to new publicly owned companies, Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear 
respectively and, in 1996, the nine civil stations were transferred again to a new publicly 
owned company Magnox Electric, which, in turn, became a division of BNFL in 1998. 
The nine civil Magnox stations were completed between 1962 and 1971 and they each 
comprise twin reactors with an output of 125-600MW (e) per reactor. Five of these 
stations have already been retired and the remaining four are expected to be closed by 
2010. The other sites inherited by the NDA from BNFL were: 
• Capenhurst. This was the site of a uranium enrichment plant, that operated from 
1953-82. Decommissioning is expected to be completed in 2006, although uranium 
materials are expected to be stored there until 2120; 
• Drigg Low Level Waste Repository. This is the UK’s low level waste repository, 
sited adjacent to the Sellafield site, that opened in 1959 and continues in operation 
following major upgrades in 1995; 
• Sellafield. Operations at Sellafield include treatment of fuels removed from 
nuclear power stations; Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication; and storage of nuclear 
materials and radioactive wastes. The site was opened in 1947 and will continue in 
operation indefinitely; 
• Springfields. Springfields manufactures nuclear fuel products for the UK’s nuclear 
power stations and for international customers. Fuel manufacture began in 1946 
and is scheduled to continue until at least 2023. 
The sites inherited by the NDA from the UKAEA were: 
• Culham JET. This is the site of fusion research and houses the Joint European 
Torus (JET). The site has been open since 1960 and operations are expected to 
close in 2007; 
• Dounreay. This is the site of development in the UK of fast reactor technology and 
has housed two reactors (a prototype and a demonstration unit) and fuel cycle 
facilities including a reprocessing plant. The site opened in the early 1950s, the 
demonstration reactor was closed in 1994 and the reprocessing plant was closed 
in 1996. 
• Harwell. Harwell was the first centre of nuclear research, being established in 
1946. The site accommodated five research reactors of various types. Harwell also 
had a number of other nuclear research facilities, together with plutonium handling 
facilities, radioactive laboratories, nuclear waste treatment and storage facilities. 
The site closed in 1990. 
• Windscale. The Windscale site is a separately licensed site within the Sellafield 
complex that housed three reactors. Two graphite pile reactors (opened in 1950) 
were closed in 1957 after a serious accident at one of them and a prototype AGR 
operated from 1963-81. 
• Winfrith. Winfrith was established as a UKAEA research site in 1958 and housed 
eight research reactors. Winfrith also had a number of other facilities including fuel 
manufacture and examination, plutonium laboratories, nuclear waste treatment 
and storage and radioactive laboratories. The last reactor closed in 1995. 
This report focuses on one Magnox plant closed several years ago, Berkeley closed in 
1989 and which is near completion of stage 2 decommissioning and the Dungeness A 
Magnox plant expected to be closed in 2006. Amongst the other sites, this report focuses 
on the huge Sellafield site, which includes a range of facilities, some still in service, some 
retired, and the Dounreay site which housed prototype and demonstration fast reactors 
and some fuel cycle facilities, but which ceased operations in 1996. 
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2 Decommissioning strategies and cost 
2.1 Current & past decommissioning activities  
2.1.1 Decommissioning activities at NDA facilities 
There are four phases in the NDA’s decommissioning plans: defuelling (conventionally 
stage 1); care and maintenance preparations (stage 2); care and maintenance; and final 
site clearance (stage 3). In 2006, of the 11 Magnox plants, four are in operation, three are 
being defuelled and five are being prepared for care and maintenance (the Calder Hall 
plant is being defuelled at the same time as care and maintenance preparations are being 
done). 
For the Dungeness A Magnox station, defuelling is expected to account for 7 per cent of 
the total undiscounted cost, care and maintenance preparations for 35 per cent, care and 
maintenance for 11 per cent and final site clearance for 46 per cent. For the non-reactor 
sites, the decommissioning operations are broken down by different categories according 
to the type of facility and the decommissioning needs. 
The NDA provides a ‘Life Cycle BaseLine’ (LCBL) for each site, covering a description of 
the decommissioning plans, including cost and timing. No estimates are shown of the cost 
of work carried out to date. The LCBL divides decommissioning activities into seven 
categories, which can be required in any of the four time phases. The seven categories 
are: 
• Transition. Transition work scope provides for the restructuring of the site 
workforce to fit the changing site mission. For the Dungeness A plant, this 
accounts for about 4 per cent of the total decommissioning cost; 
• New construction projects. This category describes new construction necessary 
throughout the lifecycle. The decommissioning of a nuclear site requires a 
significant amount of new construction in order to facilitate the deplanting, 
decontamination and demolition of the facilities. However for planning and costing 
purposes this category only includes work during Final Site Clearance (FSC). For 
the Dungeness A plant, this accounts for about 17 per cent of the total 
decommissioning cost and includes installing reactor dismantling equipment and 
waste management facilities; 
• Decommissioning and termination. The work contained in the Decommissioning & 
Termination category includes all activities undertaken on a site to decommission 
facilities starting from the end of defuelling, through to the agreed or assumed end 
state for the facilities and the site. Also included are contaminated land studies and 
any resultant remediation and post-decommissioning activities. For the Dungeness 
A plant, this accounts for about 18 per cent of the total decommissioning cost; 
• Waste and nuclear materials management. This category deals with the 
management of different types of waste on site throughout the lifecycle. This 
complies with statutory requirements and the Government’s policy on waste. For 
the Dungeness A plant, this accounts for about 22 per cent of the total 
decommissioning cost; 
• Site support. This category includes activities that directly support projects and 
operations on a site as a whole but are not dedicated to a single Operating Unit or 
project. For the Dungeness A plant, this accounts for about 27 per cent of the total 
decommissioning cost and includes expenditure on site services and operations 
and project support; 
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Table 1 Civil nuclear power plant in the UK 
Nuclear power 
plant 
Output 
(MW(e)) 
Operational 
period 
Site 
owner 
Site 
licensee 
Decomm 
started 
Expected 
completion 
Decomm 
stage 
Berkeley 2 x 138 1962-89 NDA Magnox 
Electric 
1989 2083 1+ 
Bradwell 2 x 123 1962-2002 NDA Magnox 
Electric 
2002 2104 1- 
Calder Hall 4 x 50 1956-2003 NDA Magnox 
Electric 
2003 2117 1- 
Chapelcross 4 x 50 1959-2004 NDA Magnox 
Electric 
2004 2128 1- 
Dungeness A 2 x 275 1965-2006 NDA Magnox 
Electric 
2007* 2111  
Hinkley Point A 2 x 250 1965-2000 NDA Magnox 
Electric 
2000 2104 1+ 
Hunterston A 2 x 169 1964-1989 NDA Magnox 
Electric 
1989 2090 1+ 
Oldbury 2 x 300 1967-2008 NDA Magnox 
Electric 
2009* 2118  
Sizewell A 2 x 290 1966-2006 NDA Magnox 
Electric 
2007* 2110  
Trawsfynydd 2 x 250 1965-1991 NDA Magnox 
Electric 
1993 2098 1+ 
Wylfa 2 x 590 1971-2010 NDA Magnox 
Electric 
2010* 2125  
Dungeness B 2 x 607 1983-2018 British 
Energy 
British 
Energy 
   
Hartlepool 2 x 625 1984-2014 British 
Energy 
British 
Energy 
   
Heysham 1 2 x 611 1983-2014 British 
Energy 
British 
Energy 
   
Heysham 2 2 x 615 1988-2023 British 
Energy 
British 
Energy 
   
Hinkley Point B 2 x 625 1976-2011 British 
Energy 
British 
Energy 
   
Hunterston B 2 x 624 1976-2011 British 
Energy 
British 
Energy 
   
Sizewell B 1188 1995-2035 British 
Energy 
British 
Energy 
   
Torness 2 x 645 1988-2023 British 
Energy 
British 
Energy 
   
Retired NPPs 2260 1956-2004      
Operational 
NPPs 
12307 1965-      
Source: Various plus author’s research 
Notes. 
1. All sites except those owned by British Energy are owned by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority. 
2. The break-up of British Nuclear Fuels means the licensee for a number of facilities is changing: The civil 
nuclear power plants are licensed to Magnox Electric, a division of British Nuclear Group, which is, in October 
2006, owned by British Nuclear Fuels, but which is expected to be privatised. 
3. Dates marked ‘*’ are forecast start dates. 
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Table 2 Other civil nuclear facilities in the UK 
Facility Type of facility Operating 
period 
Site 
owner 
Site licensee Decomm 
started 
Expected 
completion  
Capenhurst Enrichment plant 1953-1982 NDA BNG 1982 2006 
Dounreay Prototype NPP + others 1975-1994 NDA UKAEA 1994 2036 
Harwell 5 research reactors 1946-1990 NDA UKAEA 1990 2025 
Sellafield Various facilities 1947-? NDA BNG - - 
Springfields Fuel manufacture 1946-2023 NDA Springfields Fuels - - 
Winfrith 8 research reactors 1958-1985 NDA UKAEA 1995 2020 
Windscale 3 reactors 1950-1982 NDA UKAEA Mid 1980s 2015 
Culham JET Fusion facility 1960-2007 NDA n/a - 2022 
Drigg LLW repository 1959-2050 NDA BNG - - 
Source: Various plus author’s research 
Notes. 
1. Capenhurst, Drigg and Sellafield are licensed to the BNG; Springfields is licensed to Springfields Fuels, a 
division of Westinghouse. A bid for Westinghouse led by Toshiba was accepted in February 2006. 
2. Nuclear materials are expected to be stored at the Capenhurst site until 2120 so the site will not be 
released for unrestricted use on completion of decommissioning. 
3. The Dounreay, Sellafield and Windscale sites will only be decommissioned to ‘brown field’ status and then 
will be placed in passive safety condition 
• Support services. The activities covered in this category include provision of 
support to the decommissioning programme and management throughout the 
lifecycle. This support will fluctuate in response to the amount of decommissioning 
work taking place on site, and the differing needs of the three phases. For the 
Dungeness A plant, this accounts for about 10 per cent of the total 
decommissioning cost. It includes functional support and corporate support: The 
main areas of work covered within functional support are: finance & commercial; 
NDA contract management; human resources & training; environment, health, 
safety & quality; site management team; 
• Stakeholder support. This covers expenditure to ensure the continued support of 
stakeholders for the decommissioning strategy. For the Dungeness A plant, this 
accounts for about 2 per cent of the total decommissioning cost and includes 
communications with Members of Parliament, County and Community Councils, 
Community Groups, Local Businesses, Emergency Services, Schools & Colleges, 
Green Groups, Media and the General Public. 
2.1.2 Decommissioning activities at BE facilities 
All British Energy’s facilities are still in service. It has not published any recent detailed 
plans on how it expects to carry out the decommissioning of its facilities. Its most recent 
publicly available plans were published in September 2000 and a review of these plans by 
the British government’s Nuclear Installations Inspectorate was published in June 200112. 
                                       
12 Nuclear Installations Inspectorate ‘A review by HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate of the British 
Energy plc’s strategy for decommissioning its nuclear licensed sites.’ Health & Safety Executive, Bootle. 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/beqqr.pdf  
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2.2 Future decommissioning strategies 
2.2.1 NDA strategies 
NDA NPP sites 
The NDA is currently reviewing the UK’s decommissioning strategy and, in particular, it is 
hoping to dramatically accelerate the time-scale for Magnox decommissioning, from more 
than 100 years to 25 years. It has not yet been determined whether this is a viable plan 
and what the cost implications would be. 
On 2006 cost estimates, the total liability for the sites for which NDA is responsible is 
£61.2bn including remaining operating costs. Discounted, this reduces to £35.4bn (see 
Table 3). The undiscounted total is dominated by the cost of clean-up of the Sellafield site 
(including Drigg, Windscale and Calder Hall, which are either within or adjacent to the 
Sellafield site) with about 70 per cent of the expected cost. Dounreay is also an important 
cost element with about 5 per cent of the cost. Despite this huge expenditure, both sites 
will only be decommissioned to care and maintenance condition not green-field site. 
These two sites also account for 45 per cent of current decommissioning expenditure. The 
total NDA Liability will inevitably be significantly changed, especially if the plan to reduce 
the time-scale for decommissioning the Magnox plants is implemented. 
Table 4 shows the remaining costs by decommissioning stage. No estimate has been 
published of the cost of the work carried out to date, so there is no information on the cost 
of completed stages. The costs shown for partly completed stages are not useful for 
analytical purposes because of the lack of data on costs to date. The range of costs is 
wide (see Table 4). For the four plants that are still in service, the total cost of 
decommissioning the most expensive plant (Oldbury) is 35 per cent more than the 
cheapest (Sizewell A) and there does not seem a strong relationship with size. Some of 
the most expensive sites, such as Chapelcross and Trawsfynydd are forecast to cost 
much more than the average. For the defuelling stage (stage 1), the Wylfa is expected to 
cost nearly double the cost for Wylfa, but since the electrical output of Wylfa is double that 
of Sizewell A, this is not surprising. Care & maintenance preparations (stage 2), the 
variability is again wide with Oldbury expected to cost nearly double what Sizewell A is 
forecast to cost and again there appears little correlation with unit size. 
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Table 3  Estimated decommissioning costs by site 
Site Expected 
cost (£m) 
Remaining 
operation 
cost 
Discounted 
cost (£m) 
Decomm 
budget for 
2005/06 (£m) 
Closure 
date 
Planned 
completion 
Berkeley 773.7 - 327.7 39.1 1989 2083 
Bradwell 1086.6 20.9 544.7 64.7 2002 2103 
Calder Hall 1073.9 - 341.8 22.5 2003 2117 
Chapelcross 1332.1 - 535.0 67.3 2004 2128 
Dungeness A 1001.4 156.4 584.1 5.7 2006* 2111 
Hinkley Point  A 1213.7 - 545.6 55.3 2000 2104 
Hunterston A 1071.7 - 522.7 56.1 1989 2090 
Oldbury 1076.6 283.3 743.6 0.4 2008* 2118 
Sizewell A 870.6 131.1 475.4 0.4 2006* 2110 
Trawsfynydd 1116.1 - 431.4 45.1 1993 2096 
Wylfa 1006.5.7 606.1 862.6 0.6 2010* 2125 
Capenhurst 562.9 - 309.7 25.4 1982 2120 
Dounreay 2949.5 - 2228.6 149.7 1996 2036 
Harwell 956.7 - 788.0 60.7 1990 2025 
Sellafield 29534.9 10422.6 21929.6 290.5 -* 2150 
Springfields 445.4 2375.1 2429.8 3.9 -* 2023 
Winfrith 477.5 - 412.3 37.5 1995 2020 
Windscale 693.9 - 432.0 25.6 1980s 2015 
Culham JET 198.5 - 165.2 - 2007* 2022 
Drigg 1053.6 - 545.9 17.4 -* 2150 
TOTAL 48495.7 12786.3 35361.7 967.9   
Sources: NDA (2006) ‘Strategy’ Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, Cumbria. 
http://www.nda.gov.uk/documents/nda_final_strategy,_published_7_april_2006.pdf 
Notes 
1. Costs shown under are remaining costs and include ‘total operations cost’. 
2. Closure dates marked * are expected closure dates. 
3. Costs are discounted at 2.2 per cent per annum. 
The cost of care and maintenance also varies widely and the cost does not seem to 
correlate, as might have been expected, with the time expected to be spent in care and 
maintenance. For final site clearance, the cost of the most expensive plant (Calder Hall) is 
forecast to be 60 per cent more than the cheapest plant (Sizewell A) and again there 
appears to be little correlation with unit size. 
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Table 4  Estimated decommissioning costs (£m) and timescales of reactor sites by stage 
Site Foreca
st cost 
Defuelling Care & 
maintenance 
preparations 
Care & 
maintenance (cost 
per year) 
Final site 
clearance 
Berkeley 773.7† -* / 1989-92 172.9† / 1992-2009 131.9  (2.0) / 2009-
74 
468.9 / 2074-83 
Bradwell 1086.6† 139.9† / 2002-
06 
353.7 / 2006-2017 116.3 (1.5) / 2017-95 476.7 / 2095-
2104 
Calder Hall 1073.9† 50.8† / 2003-
08 
205.6† / 2004-2019 114.6 (1.3) / 2020-
2105 
702.8 / 2105-17 
Chapelcross 1332.1† 179.7† / 2004-
09 
300.6 / 2009-2021 176.2 (1.9) / 2021-
2116 
675.6 / 2116-28 
Dungeness 
A 
1042.9 74.6 / 2007-09 364.8 / 2009-2021 116.1 (1.4) / 2021-
2102 
487.4 / 2102-11 
Hinkley Pt  A 1213.7† -* / 2000-04 435.3† / 2004/2015 147.1 (1.8) / 2015-95 631.3 / 2095-
2104 
Hunterston 
A 
1071.7† -* / 1990-95 417.1† / 1995-2016 107.9 (1.7) / 2017-81 546.6 / 2081-90 
Oldbury 1167.5 125.2 / 2009-
10 
402.5 / 2011-2020 175.2 (2.0) / 2020-
2109 
464.6 / 2109-18 
Sizewell A 860.8 74.4 / 2007-09 211.1 / 2009-2018 145.0 (1.7) / 2018-
2102 
430.3 / 2102-10 
Trawsfynydd 1116.1† -* / 1993-95 264.2† / 1995-2012 180.1 (2.4) / 2012-88 671.7 / 2088-98 
Wylfa 1127.2 143.9 / 2010-
12 
308.7 / 2012-2025 99.2 (1.1) / 2025-
2116 
575.4 / 2116-25 
Mean 1049.6 104.5 306.7 137.2 (1.7) 557.4 
Source: LCBLs for the individual sites 
http://www.nda.gov.uk/Our_Business--Life_Cycle_Baseline_(708).aspx?pg=708 
Notes 
1. Cells marked ‘*’ are for phases that are completed, costs marked ‘†’ are for remaining costs for phases that 
are underway. 
2. For Calder Hall, the second phase is described as ‘interim decommissioning’. 
3. The mean values for each are calculated only for sites where the stage has not commenced. 
Examining the time expected to be taken for each stage (Table 5), variability is somewhat 
less with only one plant expected to take less than 100 years to be decommissioned and 
the maximum time-scale being 124 years. For the plants still in service, defuelling, and 
care and maintenance preparations are generally expected to be completed significantly 
quicker than for plants where the work has been completed or started. 
Table 5  Time taken to carry out decommissioning phases in years (range) 
 Total Defuelling Care & maintenance 
preparations 
Care & 
maintenance 
Final site 
clearance 
Completed phases - 4 (2-5) - - - 
Part completed 
phases 
106 (94-124) 5 (4-5) 16 (11-21) - - 
Phases not started 108(103-115) 2 (1-2) 11 (9-13) 81 (64-95) 10 (8-12) 
Average 107 (94-124) 3 (1-5) 13 (9-21) 81 (64-95) 10 (8-12) 
Source: LCBLs for the individual sites 
http://www.nda.gov.uk/Our_Business--Life_Cycle_Baseline_(708).aspx?pg=708 
The costs and time for final site clearance at the Calder Hall and Chapelcross sites is 
higher than for the other sites, perhaps reflecting that these are old sites, with four 
reactors compared to two at the other sites. The power density of the plants is low and 
thus a large amount of waste will be generated relative to the electrical output of the 
stations. 
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Berkeley NPP 
The Berkeley Magnox power station was the first of the purely civil nuclear plants to go 
into service in Britain and it was also the first to be retired. It is the most advanced in 
terms of its decommissioning of the retired British plants. In addition to the power station, 
the site also houses laboratory and head office facilities. 
It was completed in 1962 and retired in 1989. Stage 1 of decommissioning has already 
been completed and it is expected that stage 2 will be completed in 2009. The British 
Nuclear Group (BNG) then expects the plant to enter a ‘care and maintenance’ phase of 
about 65 years. Current BNG plans expect stage 3, clearance of the two reactor buildings, 
to commence in 2074 and for the site to be de-licensed by 208313. 
No estimate of the cost of the work carried out so far has been published, but it is 
estimated that the remaining work will cost £774m in undiscounted, current terms (see 
Table 6). This sum is reduced by nearly 60 per cent by discounting to only £328m (at the 
rate used by NDA of 2.2 per cent), with more than three quarters of the remaining 
expenditure taking place more than ten years forward. Expenditure falls steeply after year 
five, when the plant goes into the care and maintenance phase.  Overall, the largest cost 
is ‘decommissioning and termination’, accounting for 30 per cent of the remaining cost, 
with more than half of this occurring in the next five years. The next largest cost is ‘waste 
and nuclear materials treatment’ accounting for about 27 per cent of total cost, but nearly 
all this expenditure is incurred more than 10 years in the future, reflecting the fact that 
waste disposal is mainly carried out in stage III, which on these plans is not expected to 
start until 2074. ‘Site support’ and ‘new build projects’ each account for about 17 per cent 
of the remaining expenditure and these take place mainly during stage III. 
 
Table 6  Estimate of remaining cost to decommission Berkeley (£k) 
 Years 1-5 (%) Years 6-10 
(%) 
Years 11+ 
(%) 
Total (%) 
Transition 8916 (5) 246 (2) 336 (0) 9497 (1) 
New build projects 0 0 128235 (22) 128235 (17) 
Decommissioning & termination 121012 (69) 4435 (34) 102834 (18) 228281 (30) 
Waste & nuclear materials 
management 
1507 (1) 550 (4) 207080 (35) 209138 (27) 
Site support 26656 (15) 4506 (34) 99027 (17) 130188 (17) 
Support services 14455 (8) 3178 (24) 40052 (7) 57685 (7) 
Stakeholder support 2352 (1) 260 (2) 8060 (1) 10673 (1) 
Total 174898 (22) 13176 (2) 585624 (76) 773697 
(100) 
Source: British Nuclear Group (2005) ‘Lifecycle Baseline: Berkeley’ BNG, Berkeley. 
http://www.nda.gov.uk/documents/berkeley_site_summary_2005-6.pdf  
Note: The breakdown of spend is only available by the time periods shown. 
In 2006, the NDA set itself the objective of accelerating the time-scale of decommissioning 
reactors so that site clearance could be completed within 25 years of plant closure. This 
would have a major impact on the discounted cost of decommissioning and would have a 
significant impact on public spending. 
                                       
13 For more details of the Berkeley site, see  
http://www.nda.gov.uk/About_the_NDA--Locations--
Berkeley_Power_Station_and_Laboratories__(921).aspx?pg=921  
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Dungeness A NPP 
The Dungeness A power station was opened in 1965 and is expected to be closed in 
2006. The figures shown in Table 7 exclude some costs that will be incurred over the 
remaining operating life of the plant. BNG’s plan is to complete defuelling  (Stage I) by 
2009 and for the care and maintenance period (end of stage II) to start in 2021. 
Decommissioning would be completed in 2111. Dungeness A has a much higher electrical 
output than Berkeley, but because there is no published value of the cost of operations 
already carried out at Berkeley, it is difficult to compare the two costs. The time-scale is a 
little longer than for Berkeley, 105 years compared to 94 years. 
 
Table 7  Estimate of remaining cost to decommission Dungeness A (£k) 
 Years 1-5 (%) Years 6-10 
(%) 
Years 11+ 
(%) 
Total (%) 
Transition 28342 (20) 7848 (4) 11703 (2) 47893 (4) 
New build projects 7352 (5) 47716 (27) 126295 (17) 181363 (17) 
Decommissioning & termination 3952 (3) 39243 (22) 152696 (21) 195891 (18) 
Waste & nuclear materials 
management 
7403 (5) 4248 (2) 220544 (30) 232195 (22) 
Site support 67665 (47) 59642 (33) 154148 (21) 287275 (27) 
Support services 24546 (17) 17464 (10) 62877 (9) 104887 (10) 
Stakeholder support 3894 (3) 3338 (2) 11126 (2) 18358 (2) 
Total 143154 (13) 179499 (17) 739389 (69) 1067862 
(100) 
Source: British Nuclear Group (2005) ‘Lifecycle Baseline: Dungeness A’ BNG, Berkeley. 
http://www.nda.gov.uk/documents/dungeness_a_site_summary_2005-6.pdf  
Note: The breakdown of spend is only available by the time periods shown. 
The total estimated decommissioning cost is £1068m, which, with discounting (at NDA’s 
rate of 2.2 per cent), reduces to about £500m, with about 70 per cent of the work taking 
place more than ten years into the future. Overall, the costs are spread mainly between 
‘site support’ (27 per cent), ‘waste and nuclear materials management’ (22 per cent), 
‘decommissioning and termination’ (18 per cent) and ‘new build projects’ (17 per cent). 
Expenditure varies between £30m and £60m per year during the first 10 years and drops 
after year 16, when the care and maintenance phase starts. It then rises sharply in 2102 
when the final phase starts. In the first five years, the dominant cost is ‘site support and 
‘support services’ accounting for about two thirds of total expenditure. After year five, the 
preparations for care and maintenance become more important and ‘new build’ and 
‘decommissioning and termination’ become more important accounting for about half the 
expenditure. After year ten, ‘waste and nuclear materials management’ becomes the 
largest cost, accounting for about 30 per cent of expenditure. 
In 2006, the NDA set itself the objective of accelerating the decommissioning of reactors 
so that site clearance could be completed within 25 years of plant closure. This would 
have a major impact on the discounted cost of decommissioning and would have a 
significant impact on public spending. 
Other NDA sites 
The wide range of activities carried out at the other NDA sites means it is not possible to 
carry out any meaningful comparative analysis (see Table 8). 
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Dounreay 
The Dounreay site accommodated three main facilities: the Dounreay Fast Reactor 
(DFR), a 14MW plant that operated from 1959-77; the Prototype Fast Reactor (PFR), a 
250MW plant that operated from 1974-94; and a reprocessing plant for fast reactor fuel 
that closed in 1996. A complication with the site is that solid intermediate waste and some 
fuel was dumped in a in a vertical unlined water filled shaft. It was estimated that 147 kg of 
highly enriched uranium and 2.2 kg of plutonium, and more than a hundred pieces of fuel 
elements were dumped in the shaft. Boronated glass had to be dumped in the shaft in 
1968 to prevent a criticality and in 1977, a hydrogen explosion blew the shaft open 
spreading radioactive waste over the surrounding environment. 
Table 8  Forecast decommissioning costs & timescales for non-reactor sites (£m) 
Site Cost Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5 
Capenhurst 711.2 77.0/1982-
2010 
36.8/2010-15 236.9/2015-
31 
360.5/2031-
2120 
-/2120-* 
Dounreay 2949.
5 
2207.6/2005-
25 
524.3/2026-
36 
17.6/2036-
47 
200.0/2047-66 -/2066-2336* 
Harwell 915.6 345.6/2005-
12 
428.2/2012-
20 
141.8/2020-
25 
  
Sellafield 39985 3285/2005-32 13633/2005-
16 
2382/2005-
24 
6631/2005-40 14054/2040-
2120* 
Springfield
s 
1586.
3 
459.1/2005-
09 
580.9/2009-
16 
353.6/2016-
23 
131.3/2023-28 61.4/2028-31 
Culham 190.1 11.4/2005-08 63.2/2009-11 100.3/2011-
18 
9.1/2018-19 6.1/2019-20 
Drigg 1053.
6 
11.7/2005-06 29.2/2006-34 309.2/2005-
50 
172.2/2005-50 531.7/2050-67* 
Winfrith 477.5 25.1/2005-08 353.6/2005-
17 
15.5/2012-
18 
55.2/2015-18 28.2/2018-20 
Windscale 693.9 278.9/2005-
15 
53.6/2016-25 58.9/2026-
40 
302.6/2041-
65* 
 
Notes 
1. The discrepancy between the total figures and those in Table 3 is because these figures include costs from 
remaining operation. 
2. Sites marked ‘*’ are not expected to be de-licensed at the end of the process 
3. The phases are the individual sites are:  
• Capenhurst. Phase 1: diffusion plant decommissioning. Phase 2: Quiescent storage. Phase 3: 
Uranium deconversion. Phase 4: Quiescent storage 2. Phase 5: Site end state post 2120. No cost is 
given for phase 5. 
• Dounreay. Phase 1: Hazard reduction and ILW management. Phase 2: Decommissioning and 
remediation. Phase 3: Interim storage. Phase 4: Off-site transfer and final demolition. Phase 5: Care 
surveillance and site closure 2066 to 2336. No cost is given for phase 5. 
• Harwell. Phase 1: Waste operations. Phase 2: Decommissioning and land remediation. Phase 3: Site 
closure. 
• Sellafield. Phase 1: Passivation clean-up. Phase 2: Passivation commercial. Phase 3: Consolidation. 
Phase 4: Quiescent. Phase 5: Restoration. 
• Springfields. Phase 1: Magnox, oxide & hex production. Phase 2: Oxide and hex production. Phase 
3: Oxide only. Phase 4: Oxide decommissioning. Phase 5:  End of site. 
• Culham. Phase 1: Decommissioning preparation. Phase 2: tritium removal. Phase 3: Waste 
operations. Phase 4: Site clearance. Phase 5: Site closure.  
• Drigg. Phase 1: Plutonium contaminated materials retrieval. Phase 2: Remediation activities. Phase 
3: LLW operations. Phase 4: Future LLW disposals. Phase 5: Site closure. 
• Winfrith. Phase 1: Hazard reduction. Phase 2: Decommission redundant facilities. Phase 3: 
Decommission operational facilities. Phase 4: Decommission off-site facilities. Phase 5: Site close-
put and delicensing. 
• Windscale. Phase 1: High hazard reduction. Phase 2: Commercial operations and decommissioning. 
Phase 3: Care & maintenance & interim store. Phase 4: Final decommissioning and site restoration 
The decommissioning estimates were reduced between 2004 and 2005 by about £1bn 
partly through a large reduction in ‘support costs’ and the time-scale shortened so 
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decommissioning will be completed in 2036 not 2063 previously forecast (see Table 5). 
The 2036 date is described as an ‘interim end-point’. From 2036-2047 conditioned ILW 
and packaged nuclear material will be in storage at the site. This will continue until the 
conditioned ILW and packaged nuclear material can be transferred off-site. From 2047-
2066, the conditioned ILW and packaged nuclear waste will be transferred to another UK 
location. All other infrastructure will also be decommissioned apart from that which will 
support the final phase of Care, Surveillance and Site Closure from 2066. The Care, 
Surveillance and Site Closure phase is assumed to last at least a further 300 years. 
The UKAEA’s estimated costs only cover operations up to 2036 with a total expenditure of 
£2949m (see Table 9). Discounting (using the NDA’s rate of 2.2 per cent) reduces this to 
about £2150m, reflecting the fact that the estimate only covers costs up to 2036. 
The main cost, accounting for a third of expenditure is ‘decommissioning and termination’, 
with ‘new build projects’, ‘waste and materials management’ and ‘site support’ each 
accounting for about 20 per cent. Annual expenditure over the first ten years varies 
between £115-150m. After year ten, ‘new build projects’, ‘site support’ and ‘support 
services’ become less important and ‘decommission and termination’ (39 per cent) and 
‘waste and nuclear materials management’ dominate accounting for two thirds of spend. 
 
Table 9  Estimate of remaining cost to decommission Dounreay (£k) 
 Years 1-5 (%) Years 6-10 (%) Years 11+ (%) Total (%) 
New build projects 163658 (25) 183076 (31) 211814 (12) 558559 (19) 
Decommissioning & termination 136810 (21) 156210 (26) 668979 (39) 962000 (33) 
Waste & nuclear materials 
management 
95609 (14) 73460 (12) 411317 (24) 580387 (20) 
Site support 150571 (23) 115212 (19) 239450 (14) 505233 (17) 
Support services 100304 (15) 50468 (9) 120033 (7) 270804 (9) 
Stakeholder support 15070 (2) 12684 (2) 44734 (3) 72488 (2) 
Total 662022 (22) 591123 (20) 1696327 (58) 2949471 
Source: UKAEA (2005) ‘Lifecycle Baseline: Dounreay’ UKAEA. 
http://www.nda.gov.uk/documents/dounreay_site_summary_2005-6.pdf  
Note. 
1. The breakdown of spend is only available by the time periods shown. 
2. UKAEA estimates contain no costs categorised as ‘transition’. 
Sellafield 
Sellafield dominates the decommissioning liabilities for the UK, even if we exclude the 
Windscale, Calder Hall and Drigg sites, accounting for about 70 per cent of the UK’s civil 
nuclear liabilities. It is a compact site of only 4 km2, employing about 10,000 people. It is a 
complex site with several significant facilities. The main plants on the site are: 
1. Legacy ponds and silos: storage of historic waste; 
2. Sludge packaging plant: treatment and interim storage of sludges from legacy 
ponds; 
3. Box encapsulation plant: used for treatment and interim storage of sludges from 
legacy ponds 
4. Sellafield drypac plant: used to treat sludges from legacy ponds; 
5. Sellafield MOX plant: used to manufacture mixed oxide fuel; 
6. Magnox separation plant: used to reprocess Magnox fuel. This plant is scheduled 
to close in 2012; 
7. THORP head end and chemical separation: used to reprocess oxide fuel. This 
plant was closed in 2005 after a major spillage and it was not clear in May 2006 
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whether it would re-open. Its current contracts are scheduled to be completed in 
2011. 
8. HAL evaporator and storage: used to concentrate and store highly active liquor; 
9. Waste vitrification plant: converts highly active liquor into glass; 
10. Sellafield product and residue store: site store for plutonium and plutonium 
residues; 
11. Engineered drum stores: site stores for plutonium contaminated material; 
12. Encapsulated product stores: site stores for grouted wastes; 
13. SIXEP/EARP: treatment of liquid effluent prior to discharge to sea. 
The BNG’s LCBL report does not provide a breakdown of the decommissioning costs 
between the different facilities. BNG splits the decommissioning activities into five phases: 
• Passivation – Clean-Up. This is the phase in which the major hazards and 
environmental risks on the Sellafield Site are reduced substantially. This includes 
the waste retrieval operations from Legacy Ponds and Silos and the ongoing 
reduction in Highly Active Liquor (HAL) stocks in line with regulatory requirements. 
During this time, the majority of the waste on the site will have been retrieved, 
immobilised, packaged in modern containment and held in modern stores where it 
can be monitored and retrieved. Work to scope the extent of contaminated land will 
be completed and options for remediation will be identified. This phase is 
underway and is expected to be complete by 2032 and is expected to account for 
about 8 per cent of the total cost of decommissioning at Sellafield; 
• Passivation – Commercial. This is the phase in which commercial operations at 
Sellafield are completed. Thorp and Magnox reprocessing will have been 
completed thus honouring existing contracts. The Mixed Oxide (MOX) plant will 
have completed its operations producing fuel for overseas customers. The 
contracts with utility customers will have generated considerable revenue, around 
£9.5bn, which is available to fund clean-up activities. This phase is underway and 
is expected to be complete by 2016 and is expected to account for 34 per cent of 
the total decommissioning cost; 
• Consolidation. This is the phase during which remaining operations, chiefly 
storage, are rationalised and redundant buildings may be decommissioned to 
suitable hold points. During this phase all opportunities will be taken to reduce the 
site infrastructure to provide simplified, effective services at significantly reduced 
costs. A simpler, structured, prioritised programme of appropriate 
decommissioning will be completed before a quiescent hold point is reached. This 
phase is underway and is expected to be complete by 2024 and is expected to 
account for 6 per cent of the total decommissioning cost; 
• Quiescent. This is the phase during which the only significant activities are 
associated with the safe and secure storage of materials, pending the availability 
of final disposal routes and decisions on the site end point. We will minimise the 
cost at this time by deploying safe, simple and effective solutions to interim waste 
storage through effective waste sentencing and packaging and use of low 
maintenance facilities. We will seek to restrict the duration of this phase as much 
as possible in order to minimise the potential loss of key skills. This phase is 
underway and is expected to be complete by 2040 and is expected to account for 
17 per cent of the total decommissioning cost; 
• Restoration. This is the final phase in which wastes are exported to the 
Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) and High Level Waste (HLW) repositories. For the 
purpose of this Lifecycle Baseline (LCBL) it should be noted that UK-owned 
Plutonium and Uranium is assumed to remain in indefinite storage at Sellafield. 
The products of reprocessing and stored fuel will be removed, the final stages of 
contaminated land addressed and the site cleared to an agreed end point. This 
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phase is expected to commence in 2040 and to account for 35 per cent of total 
decommissioning cost. 
Site restoration is expected to be complete by 2120. It will then hold a strategic stock of 
nuclear materials for the UK. The eventual reuse or disposal of these is subject to ongoing 
review by the UK government. The site will be subject to ‘indefinite institutional control’ 
after 2120. 
 
Table 10 Estimate of remaining cost to decommission Sellafield (£k) 
 Years 1-5 (%) Years 6-10 
(%) 
Years 11+ 
(%) 
Total (%) 
New build projects 1132502 (27) 676618 (20) 2222985 (8) 4032105 (11) 
Decommissioning & termination 132346 (3) 236129 (7) 6569634 (24) 6938109 (20) 
Waste & nuclear materials 
management 
1220118 (29) 1124059 (33) 9460868 (35) 11805044 (34) 
Site support 1352188 (32) 1054221 (31) 6578436 (24) 8984845 (26) 
Support services 302587 (7) 233994 (7) 1119929 (4) 1656509 (5) 
Stakeholder support 82170 (2) 74008 (2) 1361604 (5) 1517782 (4) 
Total 4221911 (12) 3399029 (10) 27313456 (78) 34934394 
(100) 
Source: UKAEA (2005) ‘Lifecycle Baseline: Sellafield’ BNG. 
http://www.nda.gov.uk/documents/sellafield_site_summary_2005-6.pdf  
Note. 
1. The breakdown of spend is only available by the time periods shown. 
2. No expenditure is listed for transition. New costs from commercial operations are not included. 
Total estimated decommissioning cost, excluding new costs from commercial operations 
(£5050bn) is £34.9bn, which discounted at 2.2 per cent reduces to about £17bn (see 
Table 10). The main costs are ‘waste and nuclear materials management’ (34 per cent), 
‘site support’ (26 per cent) and ‘decommissioning and termination’ (20 per cent). Nearly 80 
per cent of the expenditure takes place more than 10 years forward, when 
‘decommissioning and termination’ becomes a major cost. 
NII comments 
The NDA is required by the Energy Act 2004 to consult all the principal nuclear regulators, 
including the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII), the Environment Agency (EA), the 
Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) and the Office of Civil Nuclear Security 
(OCNS), in preparing its Strategy and Annual Plans. 
NDA’s Draft Initial Strategy was published in August 200514. The NII was amongst those 
that commented15 and the NDA’s Final Strategy was published in April 200616. Whilst it 
supported the NDA’s ‘intention to expedite decommissioning timescales’ the NII asked 
NDA to provide references or detailed reasons to back up the feasibility of the proposed 
25 year timetable. NII was concerned that the Strategy placed ‘too much emphasis on 
‘value for money’ and ‘acceleration’ without addressing, as a priority, securing health and 
safety’. There was also concern about the competitive aspects of tendering, particularly 
the ‘resource implications and diversion of attention that the draft competition programme 
may have for HSE [NII’s parent body] and for the license companies, potentially to the 
                                       
14 NDA (2005) ‘Strategy: Draft for consultation’, NDA, Calderbridge. 
http://www.nda.gov.uk/documents/nda_draft_strategy_for_consultation_2005a.pdf  
15 http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/strategy.pdf  
16 NDA (2006) ‘Strategy’, NDA, Calderbridge. 
http://www.nda.gov.uk/documents/nda_final_strategy,_published_7_april_2006.pdf  
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detriment of nuclear and conventional safety’. The NDA does not state in its Final Strategy 
how it dealt with these points. 
2.2.2 British Energy sites 
British Energy’s decommissioning plans are reviewed by the regulatory agencies on a 
quinquennial basis. The most recent review by the NII before finalising this draft was 
published in 200117 and was based on three documents submitted by British Energy18.  
While British Energy stated that decommissioning will take place ‘as soon as reasonably 
practicable to do so taking into account all relevant factors’, the basis of the British Energy 
strategy was that for the AGRs, there should be a delay of at least 85 years after the end 
of generation before final dismantling is started and for Sizewell B, a delay of at least 50 
years. This appears to be based on prompt completion of stages 1 and 2 followed by a 
period of 75 years of ‘safestore’ for the AGRs and 40 years for Sizewell B. British Energy 
justifies this on grounds that deferral would reduce doses to workers by gaining benefit 
from radioactive decay.  
From the point of view of provisioning, contributions to the NLF were calculated on the 
basis that stage 3 at the AGRs was commenced 70 years after plant closure and 10 years 
for Sizewell B. In short, the costs were only discounted for 70 and 10 years respectively. 
A new review was completed in 2006, but by October 2006, it had not been published by 
the NII nor had the NDA review of these plans been published. However, in its annual 
report, British Energy reported that the review had resulted in an increase of undiscounted 
decommissioning liabilities of £2032m (discounted £956m).  British Energy stated19: 
The increase in estimate is primarily due to higher costs being assessed for decommissioning. 
The estimate is based on a highly detailed costing study, which draws on experience gained in 
both the US and UK, and includes provision for the earlier completion of certain 
decommissioning workstreams. As indicated above, the Group will be indemnified by the 
Government for any future shortfall on NLF funding of qualifying uncontracted nuclear liabilities 
and qualifying decommissioning costs and therefore the increase in liabilities as described is 
fully offset by a corresponding increase in the Government’s indemnity at that date. 
So the increased costs will be met by future taxpayers. 
NII’s comments 
The NII had two major criticisms of British Energy’s 2001 strategy20: that the long time-
scales were not justified and that the data on which cost estimates were based out of 
date. The NII said that deferral would not necessarily reduce dose rates because prompt 
decommissioning might require use of remotely operated equipment and might lead to 
lower dose rates. NII recommended that British Energy update its plans, which were 
based on data from the early 1990s to reflect British Energy’s more recent thinking 
                                       
17 Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (2001) ‘A review by HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate of the British 
Energy plc’s strategy for decommissioning its nuclear licensed sites’, HSE, Bootle. 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/beqqr.pdf  
18 British Energy ‘Corporate decommissioning strategy’ E/REP/GEN/0004/00, British Energy ‘Corporate 
decommissioning strategy’ E/REP/GEN/0005/00 and British Energy ‘Corporate arrangements for the 
management of decommissioning’ E/REP/GEN/0035/00. 
19 British Energy (2006) ‘Annual report and accounts 2005/06’, British Energy, Livingston, pp 17-18. 
20 Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (2001) ‘A review by HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate of the 
British Energy plc’s strategy for decommissioning its nuclear licensed sites’, HSE, Bootle. 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/beqqr.pdf  
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Hinkley Point B NPP 
The Hinkley Point B NPP is expected to be the first AGR to close, in 2011. British Energy 
has published no plans for decommissioning this plant. In its 2005/06 annual report, 
British Energy estimated the undiscounted cost of decommissioning its eight stations as 
£8578m. The AGRs are likely to be more expensive to decommission than Sizewell B 
because of their larger mass, but if we assume the cost of the eight stations is equal, 
Hinkley Point B will cost about £1bn to decommission. The discounted liability (British 
Energy uses a discount rate of 3 per cent) is £2.7bn, reflecting British Energy’s 
assumption that site clearance would be started at least 70 years after plant closure. In 
2001, British Energy’s policy was that stage 3 would not be commenced for at least 85 
years after plant closure, but it provided provisions on the basis that decommissioning 
would start 70 years after plant closure. 
NDA’s responsibilities for British Energy sites 
The NDA determines the decommissioning strategy, with the approval of government. It 
also has to approve the strategy for the British Energy plants. In its 2005 Strategy 
document (p 49) it states that: ‘We are responsible for the oversight of British Energy’s 
planning for and decommissioning of its nuclear power stations’. NDA is responsible for: 
reviewing and approving annual plans that (a) detail BE's work programme and costs for the 
following rolling three years and (b) detail changes in BE's nuclear liabilities cost estimates; 
reviewing and approving BE's strategies and budgets for decommissioning its power plants and 
discharging its uncontracted liabilities; confirming whether certain increases in BE's nuclear 
liabilities arising from changes in its operations should be funded through the Nuclear Liabilities 
Fund (NLF; and approving, for payment by the NLF, those invoices submitted by BE for work 
carried out in discharging those liabilities covered by the NLF. 
In response to a question about the reviews undertaken to date of any payments made 
from the NLF, an NDA representative stated21: 
‘The review process is currently underway and nearing completion. Only one minor payment 
has been approved in relation to a contract between BE and BNG. I’m afraid the documentation 
relating to this process is the property of British Energy and “Confidential”, we are therefore not 
in a position to supply copies to third parties (supplied in confidence exemption s.41 of FOI Act 
2000 would apply).’ 
There have been reports that the government will require the NDA to manage the 
decommissioning of British Energy’s NPPs although this has yet to be confirmed. 
                                       
21 NDA, personal communication 
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3 Funds and fund management 
3.1 History of provisioning 
There have been at least five major changes in the way decommissioning provisions for 
the civil nuclear power plants have been collected. 
3.1.1 Up to 1990 
Up to 1990, the CEGB and the SSEB collected provisions from electricity consumers to 
pay for the decommissioning of their Magnox (excluding Calder Hall and Chapelcross) 
and AGR stations. These were retained in the form of internal unsegregated provisions in 
the accounts. The provisions effectively existed as a proportion of the assets of the 
companies. The combined value of these provisions was £3.8bn. In theory, when 
decommissioning was required, the company could sell some assets or use cash-flow, if 
sufficient was available to meet the liabilities. When the company was privatised, the 
government retained all the proceeds from the sale (only about a third of the asset value 
of the companies) and did not pass any provisions on to the successor companies, 
Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear. So effectively the contributions made by consumers 
up to 1990 will not be available to pay for decommissioning. 
3.1.2 1990-1996 
It was found that the likely income from sale of electricity to the new electricity market for 
the nuclear plants in England and Wales fell far short of the amount to pay for operating 
the plants, dealing with the spent fuel produced and paying for decommissioning. As a 
result, the plants could not be privatised and remained in public ownership in Nuclear 
Electric and Scottish Nuclear. A consumer subsidy was created, the Fossil Fuel Levy 
(FFL), to ensure Nuclear Electric was able to continue to trade legally. The FFL 
approximately doubled the income of Nuclear Electric and the total income to Nuclear 
Electric from the FFL and from sales of electricity was guaranteed. So if the market price 
of electricity was lower than expected, the FFL would increase and vice versa. The 
intention was that the subsidy would do no more than ensure Nuclear Electric was ‘cash 
positive’. In 1990, the European Commission judged the FFL a state aid, but allowed it to 
be introduced provided it was removed by 1998. From 1990-96, about £6bn was collected 
from consumers. In theory, the FFL was payable to all technologies that did not use fossil 
fuels but, in practice, about 97 per cent of the amount collected was paid to Nuclear 
Electric. Michael Heseltine, then the responsible government minister, told Parliament this 
was ‘to pay for the decommissioning of old and unsafe stations’22. This statement was not 
accurate. There were no restrictions on the way Nuclear Electric could spend the FFL and 
it was therefore used by Nuclear Electric as additional cash flow. A small amount of 
decommissioning work was carried out, but, given that Nuclear Electric’s marginal 
expenditure was on the construction of the Sizewell B plant, which it built with no recourse 
to borrowing despite being effectively bankrupt, it must be concluded that a large amount 
of the FFL was effectively spent on building Sizewell B. A large amount, nearly £3bn, 
however, was unspent. 
When the newer nuclear plants were privatised in 1996, the sale price for the eight 
nuclear stations, including Sizewell B, was only about half the cost of building Sizewell B. 
Government retained all the proceeds of the sale and used them as additional income. So 
effectively, Sizewell B was almost given away and the proportion of the FFL spent on 
Sizewell B was lost. 
                                       
22 Heseltine M, President of the Board of Trade, Hansard, 19 October 1992. 
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The electricity market structure was different in Scotland and no wholesale market 
existed. Scottish Nuclear received a guaranteed price for its power at significantly above 
the average price paid. So consumers in Scotland were also effectively paying a subsidy 
to the nuclear power plants, but very little of this subsidy was spent on decommissioning 
the retired station (Hunterston A). 
3.1.3 Magnox Electric/BNFL (1996-2005) 
About £2.7bn of the unspent FFL was passed to Magnox Electric and then to BNFL, 
where it was retained as an identified but unsegregated fund known as the Nuclear 
Liabilities Investment Portfolio (NLIP). The fund was nominally separate and invested in 
specific funds. But it was not segregated so if BNFL had been required to discharge debts 
of any type, it would have been obliged to use the fund. It is not clear whether BNFL 
wanted to create a segregated fund, but it seems likely that the Treasury rule, that 
government entities are not allowed to set up segregated funds, would have prevented it 
from doing so. With additions and interest, the NLIP had a value of £4016m on March 31, 
2004. However, when the assets of BNFL were removed by the government and placed in 
the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, the fund was appropriated by the UK Treasury 
and placed in the consolidated fund (its normal tax and other sources income). The 
government promised to fund some of the costs of the NDA, so arguably, the NLIP is 
being passed on to the NDA, but only a small proportion of its activity is currently 
decommissioning Magnox plants, so the fund is not used for the purpose it was previously 
designed for and the proportion of the FFL passed to Magnox Electric was lost. 
3.1.4 The Secretary of State’s Undertaking (1998-2005) 
This NLIP was supplemented by a commitment from the Treasury (the Secretary of 
State’s Undertaking) in March 1998 to pay £3700m (in March 1998 values), payable 
between 2008 and 2116. The BNFL Annual Report of 2005 stated: 
The Secretary of State’s Undertaking is an agreement between Her Majesty’s Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry and Magnox Electric plc. The Secretary of State has undertaken to 
pay Magnox Electric plc £3,700million (March 1998 money values) together with interest at a 
rate of 4.5% per annum above inflation (based on RPI) on the outstanding amount. Payments 
commence in the year ending 31 March 2008 and cease in the year ending 31 March 2116. 
This sum was to grow in real terms by 4.5 per cent a year and at April 1 1999, the 
Undertaking was valued at £3934m. So, by 2008 when it would have been first payable, 
the Undertaking would have stood at £5.75bn. Any funds that had not spent until towards 
the end of the period during which they are payable (up to 2116) would have grown in 
value by a factor of more than 100. Under the then planned decommissioning timing, the 
most expensive phase of decommissioning would not have taken place until after 2100. 
Assuming a government commitment to provide funds in more than a hundred years time 
is in any way meaningful the Secretary of State’s undertaking would have covered any 
plausible decommissioning costs many times over. This undertaking may have been 
designed to facilitate privatisation of BNFL by underwriting any plausible liabilities, but it 
did not provide actual resources. The creation of the NDA took BNFL’s liabilities away 
from it and privatisation of some of the component parts of BNFL is able to proceed. The 
Secretary of State’s Undertaking was ‘extinguished’ when the European Commission 
when the European Commission’s investigation into state aid to BNFL resulting from the 
transfer of liabilities to the NDA allowed the creation of the NDA. On March 31 2005, the 
Secretary of State’s Undertaking was reported by BNFL to be worth £5956m. 
In practical terms, the Secretary of State’s Undertaking was never more than a device to 
allow BNFL to continue trading. In the event of BNFL’s failure, the government would have 
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had to pay assume the responsibility for dealing with its liabilities in any case so the 
Undertaking did not represent a meaningful additional commitment. 
3.1.5 British Energy (1996-2005) 
Of the unspent FFL receipts, £228m was passed on to British Energy to be placed in the 
segregated fund (Nuclear Generation Decommissioning Fund or NDF) it was required to 
set up for decommissioning its plants. The target value of the fund was 110 per cent of the 
accrued discounted liabilities that were to be covered by the fund. Whilst this appeared to 
represent a major step forward in protecting funds compared to earlier provisioning 
schemes, the weakness of the system was that the funds were only required to pay for 
stages II and III of decommissioning with the cost of stage 1 to be paid from cash flow. 
Whilst it was plausible for the first stations to be retired, for the last stations still in service, 
there would have been no plants remaining to generate cash flow to pay for stage 1. 
It is not clear why the decision to exclude stage 1 from the decommissioning fund was 
taken, a decision that is contrary to practice in other countries with segregated 
decommissioning funds. However, the sale value of the eight stations was very low, about 
£1.7bn, probably less than 10 per cent of their replacement cost and only about half the 
cost of building Sizewell B alone. If British Energy had been required to contribute the cost 
of phase 1 to the NDF, it is likely the market would have valued the company at an even 
lower and possibly negative figure. 
While these two stages are the most expensive in undiscounted terms, using the positive 
discount rate adopted by British Energy, 3 per cent, and assuming that decommissioning 
is not completed until up to a century after plant closure, the sums required to fund stages 
II and III are very small. For example, if it is assumed stage III decommissioning costs 
about £500m but is not carried out until 80 years after plant closure, the amount required 
at plant closure in the fund to pay for stage III would be only £47m. As a result, British 
Energy was required to make additions of only less than £20m per year to the fund 
despite the undiscounted liability for decommissioning being in the order £5bn. 
The value of the fund fluctuated widely over the period 2000-04. No payments were made 
from it during this period and the fluctuations reflect changes in market value. In 2003, 
exceptional charges of £124m were recorded and in 2002, exceptional charges of £27m 
were recorded, while an exceptional increase in value of £59m was recorded in 2004. 
By September 2002, British Energy had effectively financially collapsed because its 
income from sales of electricity was insufficient to meet its costs and liabilities, partly 
decommissioning, but mainly dealing with spent fuel. In fact, the trustees (the Nuclear 
Trust) of the decommissioning fund, the NDF, appear to have precipitated the collapse of 
British Energy by serving a default notice relating to the solvency of British Energy 
because it was unable to pay even the small sum required for the NDF. The UK 
government mounted an extremely expensive rescue, assuming most of the liabilities in 
return for rights to 65 per cent of the company’s future net income, the so-called ‘cash 
sweep’. This was subject to a state aid investigation by the European Commission, which 
allowed the rescue, with some conditions, in 2004, and the company was re-launched in 
March 2005. 
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The UK decommissioning fund included debt and equity securities with market values of 
£44m and £396m respectively at 31 March 2004 compared to £43m and £291m in 2003. 
 
Table 11 Value of the NDF (£m) 
Year Contribution Value 
2000 18 360 
2001 18 397 
2002 18 411 
2003 19 334 
2004 - 440 
Source: British Energy Annual Report and Accounts. 
Note: Contributions are made during the year and are credited in the next annual report, e.g., the £19m 
contributed in 2003 is reflected in the 2004 figure. 
3.1.6 British Energy (2005 onwards) 
The scope of the segregated fund, the NDF, renamed the Nuclear Liabilities Fund (NLF), 
was widened to include uncontracted nuclear liabilities, mostly dealing with spent fuel from 
the Sizewell B PWR. The assets of the NDF were transferred to the NLF and British 
Energy Holdings plc issued £275m in New Bonds to the NLF. The ratings agencies gave 
these bonds a very low rating. Standard and Poors rated them BB, Fitch rated them BB- 
and Moody’s Ba3. 
The NLF had a value of about £782m in March 2005. Government now controls the 
segregated fund and British Energy pays in a flat sum of £20m per year. British Energy 
states that the government will pay any income from the ‘cash sweep’ into the segregated 
fund. The rights to 65 per cent of British Energy’s income can be converted into shares, 
representing 65 per cent of the value of British Energy (1,042 million additional shares). If 
the Cash Sweep was fully converted to shares, the NLF would hold up to 65 per cent of 
the enlarged equity share capital of the Company. However, the terms of the conversion 
include a limit on the voting rights of such shares equal to a maximum of 29.9 per cent 
whilst held by the NLF. The value of a converted Cash Sweep would be totally dependent 
on the share price. In the period from June 1 2005 to Aug 31 2006, the share price for 
British Energy varied between £3.33 and £7.30. 
The government announced it would consider selling the shares when the review of 
energy policy, was complete. However, in August 2006, British Energy announced to 
shareholders that its output for 2006/07 would be reduced because of problems with the 
boilers at two of the AGR stations. This led to a fall of 10 per cent in the price of the 
shares and the government put plans to sell the shares, reported to be an early priority in 
August, on hold. It is not clear yet whether the proceeds of any share sale would be paid 
into the NLF or whether they would be paid into the government’s consolidated fund 
(general tax income). 
There is no commitment by British Energy to ensure the fund will be adequate to meet all 
the liabilities it is eligible to pay for and the government is underwriting the fund, although 
it will not make any contributions until the fund is exhausted. 
The discount rate 
A particular issue has arisen with the discount rate. Under the NDF, the fund was a private 
sector fund and the rate at which liabilities were discounted, 3 per cent, was decided by 
British Energy subject to the approval of the company’s auditors and the NII. Now that the 
government is underwriting the costs, the discount rate used should be chosen by 
government. Until April 2005, Treasury guidelines were that for liabilities, costs should be 
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discounted at a rate of 3.5 per cent and that was the figure adopted by British Energy. 
From April 1 2005, the Treasury’s recommended rate for liabilities was reduced to 2.2 per 
cent23. However, British Energy continued to use 3 per cent. British Energy was 
questioned about this in March 2006 by the UK House of Commons Public Accounts 
Committee, but British Energy officials were unable to explain their choice of discount 
rate24. 
Over the minimum period of deferral assumed for the AGRs of 70 years, this will make a 
major difference to the discounted liability faced underwritten by the public. A liability 
discounted at 3.5 per cent for 70 years would have a discounted value of only 9 per cent 
of its undiscounted value, while a liability discounted at 2.2 per cent for 70 years would 
have a discounted value of 22 per cent of its undiscounted value. 
3.1.7 Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (2005 onwards) 
From 2002 onwards, it was clear that BNFL did not have the resources to pay for all its 
decommissioning and other liabilities and it was technically bankrupt. Plans to privatise 
BNFL were abandoned. The total undiscounted cash flow that would be needed to 
discharge its liabilities was estimated at £41,361m, of which BNFL would be liable for 
about 68 per cent. Given that its assets only amounted to £5657m plus an undertaking by 
the government to pay £5525m in clean-up costs, the need to reform BNFL was clear. It 
was decided to remove all its historic UK assets from it, including the nuclear power plants 
and the Sellafield complex and place them in a new government owned organisation, the 
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). This included some operating facilities, for 
example, some of the Magnox plants and some reprocessing facilities. 
In 1996, UKAEA was split into two parts: one part retained the existing liabilities and was 
responsible for dealing with them; and the other contained the technical expertise and was 
privatised as AEA Technology. Subsequently, AEA Technology withdrew from all activities 
in the nuclear sector, but UKAEA has tried to develop a competitive business dealing with 
clean-up and decommissioning. The liabilities of the UKAEA were also transferred to the 
NDA. NDA was formally started on April 1 2005, but transfer of the assets did not occur 
because of an investigation by the European Commission into whether the transfer 
represented an unfair state aid, on the grounds that BNFL would be allowed to continue to 
trade after the transfer having failed to discharge its liabilities. In April 2006, the European 
Commission approved the deal with some conditions25. 
It is expected that both the British Nuclear Group (BNG) division of BNFL, the division 
responsible for operating the main facilities and the UKAEA will be privatised now that 
they have been relieved of their financial obligation to decommission their sites. 
In the preparation for the creation of the NDA, there was considerable debate about how it 
should be funded. The 2002 White Paper on dealing with nuclear waste26 raised the issue, 
for long-term nuclear liabilities, of continuity of funding and the short-term nature of any 
                                       
23 Note for investments, the Treasury recommends a discount rate of 3.5% should be used only for the first 30 
years; for years 31 to 75 the figure should be 3% and for years 76 to 125 the figure should be 2.5%. 
24 Public Accounts Committee (2006) ‘Minutes of evidence taken before the Committee of Public Accounts: 
Monday 27 March 2006. The restructuring of British Energy’ Uncorrected transcript of oral evidence’ To be 
published as HC 1025-i. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmpubacc/uc1025-
i/uc102502.htm  
25 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/428&format=HTML&aged=0&language=E
N&guiLanguage=en  
26 UK Government (2002) ‘A better quality of life: a strategy for sustainable development for the UK’ (Cm 
4345, The Stationery Office, London, ISBN 0-10-143452-9. 
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funding commitments the government can make under the system of three-year spending 
reviews that the British government operates. It acknowledged that: 
‘In the past, nuclear clean up has also been seen as a low priority for funding purposes relative 
to other programmes. Experience to date with UKAEA has therefore been that settlements have 
tended to be the minimum necessary to address safety and environmental needs and that 
limited funding has been available for other projects’ 
It offered two options for the NDA as ways to provide greater assurance of funding: a 
‘segregated fund’ and a ‘statutory segregated account’. The segregated fund would be an 
identifiable set of assets managed in the same way as pension funds. Of course, a key 
difference between this form of nuclear segregated fund and a pension fund is that people 
putting money into pension funds benefit personally from their contributions and therefore 
have an incentive to contribute, while the Treasury would tend to postpone operations and 
minimise contributions. 
However, for the government to set up a segregated fund would go against general 
government policy. The Treasury has always resisted efforts to ‘earmark’ or hypothecate 
funds, preferring to have maximum flexibility to use funds in whatever way it sees fit. The 
Treasury argues that this allows it to get the best return on the money at its disposal. 
A statutory segregated account would require annual notional payments towards clean-up 
and would represent a statutory commitment to fund decommissioning but the money 
would not be in a separate identifiable pot. Government would merely provide assurances 
that the money committed would be available when required. 
In practice, the government would simply be writing committing to provide funds in the 
future, a responsibility it would have had in any case, and the government would be able 
to use the money as it wished until it was actually required. Clearly the latter would be the 
Treasury’s preferred alternative because it would give it full freedom to use the money. 
Neither scheme offered by government comes close to the polluter pays ideal. In both 
cases, contributions would be annual, from tax income and would be calculated on the 
basis of short-term need. If there was no immediate need for funds, no contribution would 
be made. Taxpayers 150 years from now could still be paying to clean up the current 
generation’s nuclear power stations. 
Ironically, the White Paper made much of the short time-frame of only three years that 
clean-up funds were committed under the previous arrangements and it promised a 10-
year funding commitment to facilitate planning of expenditure. In December 2003, the 
Energy Minister, Stephen Timms was still voicing publicly the government’s decision to set 
up a ‘Statutory Segregated Account’ to ‘provide a rolling commitment of funds for a period 
of at least 10 years ahead.’ However, in 2004, the time horizon was reduced back to three 
years. By not choosing a segregated fund, and by not extending the time-scale beyond 
the previous three years, it would appear that despite the apparent intentions of the White 
Paper, the British government has not made any additional commitment to funding the 
clean-up work. The government would ultimately have to pay for decommissioning if all 
other funding sources failed so the government has actually made no new commitment. 
The NDA receives income from the operation of the facilities that it owns that are still in 
service as well as income from the Treasury and this contributes part of its budget, 
although this will necessarily tail off rapidly as the existing facilities close. NDA’s budget 
for 2005/06 was £2.2bn and income from operating facilities was expected to represent 
about half NDA’s income. 
However, an equipment failure at the THORP reprocessing plant discovered in April 2005 
in the Sellafield complex led to its long-term closure, so income from this facility will not be 
generated until and if the plant is re-opened. The clean-up and repairs to the plant will 
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also be a major cost to NDA. By June 2006, it was not clear when or if the THORP 
reprocessing plant would re-open, by the government’s Health & Safety Executive has 
announced its intention to prosecute the license-holder for the site, BNG, for the failure. 
The discount rate 
Prior to the setting up of the NDA, the UKAEA used a discount rate of 3.5 per cent, while 
BNFL used a rate of 2.2 per cent. NDA uses 2.2 per cent, the Treasury recommended 
rate. 
3.2 Setting aside funds 
Currently the only tangible funds are the previous provisions made by British Energy to 
the Nuclear Liabilities Fund (see Table 12). These will be supplemented by future 
payments to the NLF and any payments to the NLF made under the ‘cash sweep’. 
 
Table 12 History of decommissioning provisions 
Scheme Facilities covered Owner Provisions Form Remaining funds 
-1990 9 civil Magnoxes & 
7 AGRs 
CEGB/ 
SSEB 
£3.8bn Internal 
accounting 
provisions 
£0 
1990-96 FFL 8 civil Magnoxes, 5 
AGRs and 1 PWR 
Nuclear 
Electric 
£6bn Cash-flow to 
Nuclear 
Electric 
£2.7bn to Magnox 
Electric & £228m 
to British Energy 
1996-2005 NLIP 11 civil Magnoxes 
& other BNFL 
facilities 
BNFL £4016m Internal fund £0 
1998-2006 Secretary 
of State’s 
Undertaking 
All facilities owned 
by BNFL 
BNFL £5956m Government 
undertaking 
£0 
1996-2005 NDF 7 AGRs & 1 PWR British 
Energy 
£440m External 
segregated 
fund 
£440m to NLF 
2005- NLF 7 AGRs, 1 PWR 
and spent fuel from 
Sizewell B 
British 
Energy 
£782m + 
Cash 
Sweep 
External 
segregated 
fund 
£782m + Cash 
Sweep 
2005- Statutory 
segregated account 
All liabilities except 
those owned by 
British Energy 
NDA £0 Government 
commitment 
£0 
Source: Author’s research 
The British Energy Annual Report of 2004/05 states: 
The Group will also now make the following payments to the NLF: (i) an annual contribution 
initially equal to 65% of the Group’s adjusted net cash flow, adjusted for certain corporate 
actions but never to exceed 65% (the NLF Cash Sweep Payment); (ii) fixed decommissioning 
contributions equal to £20m per annum (indexed to RPI from March 2003 but tapering off as the 
nuclear power stations are currently scheduled to close); and (iii) £150,000 (indexed to RPI from 
March 2003) for every tonne of uranium in PWR fuel loaded into the Sizewell B reactor after the 
Restructuring Effective Date [April 1, 2005]. 
The contributions to the NLF for decommissioning are only partly based on need: they are 
either flat rate fixed contributions, variable contributions depending on the amount of fuel 
used or are based on British Energy’s ability to pay (the ‘cash sweep’). It is not clear how 
realistic the contributions for dealing with spent fuel are. 
As noted in 3.1.5, the ‘cash sweep’ would come to an end if the government converts this 
to shares and sells the shares. It remains to be seen whether the proceeds of such a 
share sale would be paid into the NLF. 
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3.3 Management of funds 
There have been two identifiable funds set up to pay for decommissioning and other long-
term liabilities: the Nuclear Liabilities Investment Portfolio (NLIP) operated by BNFL from 
1998-2005; and the Nuclear Decommissioning Fund (NDF), which, in 2005, became the 
Nuclear Liabilities Fund (NLF) and applies to British Energy plants. 
3.3.1 Nuclear Liabilities Investment Portfolio 
The NLIP was set up in 1998 using most of the unspent proceeds (£2.7bn) of the Fossil 
Fuel Levy (FFL). The fund was used by BNFL to discharge liabilities, with the agreement 
of BNFL’s shareholder, the British government. BNFL’s Annual Report of 2003 stated the 
investment policy it adopted for the NLIP as follows: 
The Nuclear Liabilities Investment Portfolio (NLIP) represents funds earmarked for the costs 
associated with the discharge of nuclear liabilities. In order to ensure that funds are available 
when needed to meet the long-term nuclear liabilities, the investment policy has to address 
long-term returns and their relationship to inflation, the effects of taxation, credit risk and 
reinvestment risk. The fund is thus invested in a combination of index-linked gilts and a 
managed portfolio, invested through fund managers. 
i. Gilts investment portfolio 
The Group has invested £2,039 million of the portfolio in index-linked gilts and £309 million in 
conventional gilts, which are intended to be held until redemption. The index-linked gilts have an 
average maturity of 10.16 years and returned 2.04% p.a. after tax and inflation this year. The 
advantages of this instrument to the portfolio are tax-free indexation cover for inflation, a roughly 
constant annual post-tax real yield to maturity and excellent credit risk. There are two areas of 
risks associated with this instrument; firstly the taxation legislation may change; and secondly, 
given the longest maturity is up to 2024, but the nuclear liabilities go out to 2150, there will be a 
significant degree of refinancing risk if the Government does not issue longer-maturing index-
linked gilts in due course. 
ii. Managed portfolio 
£1,495 million is invested through fund managers, against either a LIBID or index-linked 
benchmark dependent upon the maturity profile of the investment. The purpose of using fund 
managers is to provide some flexibility and add value by active strategic investment. 
Performance is monitored through monthly reports and regular meetings. The potential change 
in value on the funds is controlled by the benchmarks and by maturity limits. Credit risk on non-
gilt investments is controlled by limiting the amount that can be placed with each counterparty 
and specifying a minimum creditworthiness of the counterparty as determined by the rating 
agencies. 
From 2003 onwards, the BNFL Annual Reports acknowledged that the NLIP would be 
transferred to the NDA, once it was established. However, the European Commission’s 
investigation into the NDA arrangements delayed the process and only £1369m out of a 
total value of the NLIP at that time of £3750m. It was expected that if and when the 
Commission cleared the NDA arrangements, the remainder of the NLIP would be 
transferred to the UK government. Commission clearance was given on 4 April 2006, but 
there has been no confirmation whether the transfer has taken place. 
3.3.2 Nuclear Decommissioning/Liabilities Fund 
The NDF was set up in 1996 when British Energy was created as an investor-owned 
nuclear generation company, owning the eight most modern nuclear plants. It received 
£228m from the unspent proceeds of the FFL. The target value of the fund was 110 per 
cent of the accrued discounted liabilities. The British Energy Annual report of 2002/03 
(Form 20-F) stated: 
The Decommissioning Fund is owned by the trustees of an independent trust, the Nuclear 
Trust. The Decommissioning Fund was established to accumulate funds to meet our Stage 2 
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and Stage 3 decommissioning costs, including on-site waste management. We made an initial 
endowment of £228 million to the Decommissioning Fund in July 1996. We make quarterly 
contributions to the Decommissioning Fund, which are subject to an adjustment for inflation. 
During the year ended March 31, 2003, these contributions totalled £18 million. 
However, by September 2002, British Energy was near collapse. British Energy reported 
in its Annual Report of 2002/03 (Form 20-F): 
On September 25, 2002 the Decommissioning Fund served a default notice relating to the 
solvency of the Company, British Energy Generation Limited and British Energy Generation 
(UK) Limited. Unless the default is cured to the satisfaction of the Decommissioning Fund, or 
waived, the Decommissioning Fund has the right to require accelerated payment of all of the 
contributions due to the Decommissioning Fund prior to the next quinquennial review in Autumn 
2005. The Decommissioning Fund has agreed not to take enforcement action without further 
notice while the British Energy Group continues to make progress toward completing its 
proposed restructuring. If the proposed restructuring is effective, the NLF will replace the 
Decommissioning Fund. 
The government’s rescue of British Energy was delayed by a state aid investigation by the 
European Commission and was not approved until September 2004. The company was 
re-launched on April 1, 2005, with the new Nuclear Liabilities Fund. The 2005/06 British 
Energy Annual Report does not detail the investment policies of the Nuclear Trust. The 
Nuclear Trust is a charitable trust governed by a Trust Deed; three independent trustees 
are appointed by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and two by British Energy. 
3.4 Special cases: Fall-back option and transfer of ownership 
Clearly for the NDA assets, the government is the funder and there is no scope for a fall-
back option. For the British Energy liabilities the Government also provides an indemnity 
to indemnify British Energy against any future shortfall on NLF funding of qualifying 
uncontracted nuclear liabilities (including PWR back end fuel services) and qualifying 
nuclear decommissioning costs. 
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4 Transparency of the funding scheme to the public 
The details of the funding schemes have always been in the public domain, through 
company reports, legislation and, increasingly web-sites. The creation of the NDA 
represents a major step forward in bringing this material together and making it accessible 
through their web-site. In particular, the Lifecycle Baselines for each facility represent a 
major improvement in publicly available documentation. 
By contrast, the British Energy plans are not easily accessible although this may be 
related to the efforts to rescue the company and the fact that the new company has only 
been in existence since January 2005. 
British Energy, the NDA and the Department of Trade and Industry were all contacted by 
the author as part of this project to clarify details of their decommissioning policy but none 
of these organisations granted an interview. 
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5 Stakeholder analysis 
For some of the NDA sites, there are ‘Site Stakeholder Groups’ (SSGs)27 which are fora 
‘for the local community to interface with the Nuclear Site Operator’. SSGs exist for four of 
NDA’s sites, Berkeley, Oldbury, Chapelcross and Winfrith. A National Stakeholder Group 
(NSG)28 was also set up by the NDA, managed by an independent charitable organisation, 
the Environment Trust29. Both the NSG and the SSGs are relatively new organisations and 
it is difficult to make a judgement yet on how effective they will be. 
                                       
27 http://www.nda.gov.uk/Stakeholder--Site_Stakeholder_Groups_(1425).aspx?pg=1425  
28 
http://www.nda.gov.uk/documents/summary_report_from_nda_national_stakeholder_group_nsg_april_2006.
pdf  
29 A list of members can be found at 
http://www.envcouncil.org.uk/docs/List%20of%20NSG%20members.pdf  
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6 Conclusions and recommendations 
The UK’s decommissioning plans are advanced and probably better documented than 
elsewhere in Europe, mainly because UK was a pioneer in nuclear power and has many 
retired nuclear facilities that need to be decommissioned. The UK government’s Nuclear 
Decommissioning Authority (NDA) was set up in 2005 to take over the sites previously 
owned by BNFL and the UKAEA and is expected to manage the decommissioning of 
British Energy’s sites. 
The total cost of decommissioning Britain’s civil nuclear facilities is currently estimated to 
be in excess of £75bn, although it is widely expected that this figure will rise. The cost 
estimates are dominated by two sites, Dounreay and Sellafield, which account for about 
75 per cent of the total liability. These sites have two things in common: large amounts of 
plutonium were handled there and they were both sites of accidents that led to the release 
of radioactive material. 
British governments have continued to avow the ‘polluter pays’ principle as a basis of  
their environmental policy, which implies that funds to decommission facilities should be 
provided by consumers of the output of these plants. Despite this, funding has been 
mismanaged and as a result, after more than 25 years of contributions, there is only about 
£800m in identified funds to pay for a liability in excess of £75bn. In the new arrangements 
for any future nuclear power plants, the ‘polluter pays’ principle is conspicuously absent 
from the list of principles that will underlie future arrangements. 
A segregated fund (NDF) for British Energy’s power plants was set up when British 
Energy was created in 1996. However, the scope of the fund was inadequate - it did not 
cover stage 1 – and British Energy collapsed in 2002. This illustrates that even a 
segregated fund, which relies on contributions from consumers over the expected life of 
the plant, is not a guarantee that adequate funds will be available when needed. 
British Energy was rescued at huge expense to British taxpayers. The NDF has been 
renamed the NLF and expanded to include some fuel waste management costs. British 
Energy will make contributions to the fund, but these are related to their ability to pay, not 
to the scale of the liability. The contributions are also heavily dependent on the profitability 
of British Energy. Should this company find itself in financial difficulties again, an 
eventuality that is by no means unlikely, the fund could again be at risk of falling far short 
of the requirements. Expanding the fund to include some spent fuel disposal costs might 
seem a good way to ensure these costs are covered. However, in practical terms, the 
effect of this change might be simply to allow the Treasury to access it earlier than it 
would have otherwise been able to postponing the time when taxpayer funds were 
needed. As the NDF only covered stages 2 and 3, most of the funds would not have been 
accessible for 70 years or more. 
By international standards, the UK timescales for decommissioning are extraordinary, with 
completion of final clearance for nuclear power plants not expected to be completed until 
up to 130 years after plant closure. NDA has an objective to reduce this to 25 years, which 
will increase undiscounted costs and massively increase discounted costs. While the NDA 
has a supervisory role over plans to decommission British Energy’s plants, it is not clear 
whether it is able to require British Energy to reduce the timescales for its plants, which on 
current plans assume site clearance is not completed until nearly 100 years after plant 
closure. 
The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority might be a useful (not perfect) model for other 
countries for managing decommissioning once the facilities have closed. It creates an 
agency that was not party to the creation of the liabilities and is not a commercial concern. 
It therefore has no prior interest in minimising cost estimates or lengthening time-scales in 
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order to reduce the present value of its liabilities or to bolster its technical reputation. The 
NDA has contributed to transparency by published a vast amount of useful and accessible 
material on its decommissioning plans and the estimated costs through the ‘Lifecycle 
Baselines’ it publishes for each of its main facilities. The NDA may, in due course, suffer 
‘capture’ by the nuclear industry or it might feel the need to cut costs to demonstrate its 
management skills but, to date, NDA has improved the transparency of the 
decommissioning Process significantly. 
Ironically, the failure of British Energy and the transfer of most of its decommissioning 
liabilities to the taxpayer also removed the incentives on British Energy to reduce the 
decommissioning liabilities for short-term commercial reasons, albeit at the expense of 
having to abandon the ‘polluter pays’ principle. 
It is difficult to determine to what extent the recent steep increases in decommissioning 
cost estimates are the result of the removal of the commercial pressures to reduce 
forecast liabilities and how far the increases are the result of more detailed planning of 
decommissioning. 
While facilities are still in operation, the operator will have much more intimate knowledge 
of the facility and must play the lead role in planning and estimating the cost of 
decommissioning. However, British experience does seem to underline the importance 
subjecting plans and cost estimates to regular independent scrutiny to prevent commercial 
interests distorting plans. 
The British government is now contemplating building up to ten nuclear plants. In October 
2006, the British government was still developing its plans on how decommissioning 
would be provisioned for any new plants. It will be important to ensure that any measures 
adopted are likely to be more effective than the previous efforts in Britain to make the 
‘polluter pay’ and ensure that those that have to decommission the nuclear plants that 
current consumers will benefit from are endowed with adequate funds to carry out the task 
even if, unavoidably, they will have to do the potentially hazardous job. Somewhat 
surprisingly, in the list of principles that would under lie a decommissioning, the polluter 
pays principle is not listed.30  
                                       
30 The principles the government listed are: There should be an upfront assessment of decommissioning 
costs; Full responsibility for decommissioning costs to be retained by the private sector operator(s); 
Protection will be given to the public sector regarding credit risk and reduced reactor life; The framework 
should be robust and transparent through time; These principles will form the basis of arrangements which 
will apply consistently to all new build operators and reactor types. http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file31890.pdf  
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Annex Organisations involved in nuclear power in UK 
 
British Energy 
In 1996, all 7 AGR stations and the then complete PWR (Sizewell B) were privatised in a 
new company, British Energy. This ran into financial difficulties in 2002 and the company 
was eventually re-launched in 2005 after massive government assistance with liabilities 
and costs. 
British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL) 
British Nuclear Fuels Limited was set up in 1973 as a nationally owned organisation to 
own and operate the UK’s fuel production, waste disposal and other activities. 
Subsequently it acquired the nuclear vendor businesses of Westinghouse (1998) and ABB 
(1999). In 2005, ownership of its sites was passed to the Nuclear Decommissioning 
Authority and the company began to be broken up. The reactor vending, servicing and 
fuel manufacture functions were sold as the Westinghouse division to Toshiba in 2006 
and the British Nuclear Group (BNG), which carries out the work at the reactor and fuel 
cycle facilities (excluding fuel manufacture) is expected to be privatised in 2006. 
Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) 
Until 1990, the publicly owned CEGB owned and operated virtually all power stations in 
England and Wales, including the commercial, civil nuclear plant. At the time of its break-
up in 1990, it owned 8 operating Magnox nuclear stations, 5 operating Advanced Gas-
cooled Reactor (AGR) stations and was building a Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR).  
Committee on Radioactive Waste Management 
The Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM) is an independent 
committee appointed by the UK Government. Its task is to review the options for 
managing those UK radioactive wastes for which there is no agreed long-term 
solution. CoRWM was asked to consult and to make recommendations to the UK 
Government in 2006. 
Magnox Electric 
In 1996, the 9 civil Magnox stations were transferred from Nuclear Electric and Scottish 
Nuclear to a new, publicly owned company, Magnox Electric. In 1998, this was absorbed 
into BNFL along with its two dual purpose Magnox stations. 
Ministry of Defence 
The Ministry of Defence owns a number of other military nuclear facilities (e.g., submarine 
bases) 
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority 
The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority was created in 2004 to own all the UK’s civil 
nuclear sites except those owned by British Energy, and to mange their decommissioning. 
Nuclear Electric 
In 1990, all the CEGB’s nuclear power plants were transferred to a new publicly owned 
company, Nuclear Electric, which operated them until 1996. 
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Nuclear Installations Inspectorate 
The Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) is the government body responsible for 
regulating the safety of nuclear installations. It is located within the government’s Health 
and Safety Executive (HSE), which itself is sponsored by the Department of Work and 
Pensions. 
Scottish Nuclear 
In 1990, all the SSEB’s nuclear power plants were transferred to a new publicly owned 
company, Scottish Nuclear, which operated them until 1996. 
South of Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB) 
Until 1990, the publicly owned SSEB owned all the commercial civil nuclear power plants 
in Scotland, including one retired Magnox station and two operating AGRs. 
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) 
The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, owned by the UK government, was set up 
in 1954 to oversee the UK nuclear research programme, both civil and military including 
the fusion programme. It built, owned and operated all nuclear facilities, except for the 
purely civil power stations until it was split up in the early 1970s. 
Then, weapons research, fuel production, isotope production and radiological protection 
were transferred to other organisations: in 1971, the Atomic Weapons Research 
Establishment (AWRE), later Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) for weapons 
production; in 1973, British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL) for fuel production and other 
activities; URENCO for uranium enrichment Amersham International (1983) for isotope 
production, privatised in 1982 and taken over by General Electric in 2004; Nuclear 
Installations Inspectorate (NII), set up in 1960 as part of the government’s Health and 
Safety Executive, to regulate the safety of the UK nuclear sites. 
